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Four Scenarios of Development and the Role
of Economic Policy.
Fabrizio Carmignani
School of Economics, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia

Abdur Chowdhury

Department of Economics , Marquette University , Milwaukee, USA

Abstract

We ask which economic policies can help a country create the most favourable conditions for development. We
observe that the dynamics of several development indicators can be grouped into four clusters, each cluster
corresponding to a different combination of growth and changes in inequality. Based on this observation, we
define four different development scenarios and use limited dependent variable regressions to study how
structural and policy factors affect a country's probability to achieve the most (or the least) favourable of these
scenarios. Our results point to a comforting picture: through the choice of appropriate policies countries can
effectively increase their chances to achieve the most favourable development scenario.

I. Introduction
Between 1993 and 2000 South Africa experienced an increase in the poverty headcount accompanied by a sharp
decrease in average life expectancy and a growing proportion of undernourished children. Similar trends were
observed in Ivory Coast, Moldova, Belarus, and Burundi, just to mention a few countries. Over the same period
of time, countries like Lithuania, Vietnam, Pakistan, and Gambia achieved a significant reduction in monetary
poverty, longer life expectancy, higher rates of immunisation, and lower rates of child mortality and
undernourishment. This large variety of development experiences raises a simple, albeit crucial, question: to
what extent can economic policies help create favourable conditions for faster development?
In this article we attempt to provide an answer to this question by exploiting an interesting feature of the
development data. We observe that the dynamics of several development indicators can be grouped into four
clusters, each cluster corresponding to a different combination of growth and changes in inequality. In this way,
we can identify four scenarios of development. We then use an ordered probit model to study how structural
and policy factors affect the probability of a country ending-up in the most (or least) favourable of these four
scenarios. As discussed in more detail below, this approach has a couple of important advantages. First, given
that the scenarios account for the different dynamics of several development indicators (and not just one
indicator), our approach allows us to study the conditions for broad development. That is, we look at
development in its multidimensionality and not just at how policies can help improve one specific development
indicator. Moreover, we can do this without having to construct an arbitrary aggregate measure of
development. Second, with the ordered probit model we avoid some of the pitfalls that arise when using growth
and inequality as continuous dependent variables in single or system equation estimation. These advantages
come at no real cost in terms of loss of information as the categorical dependent variable in our model turns out
to be a very strong predictor of development outcomes, possibly even stronger than the continuous measures of
growth and inequality.
Our main results can be summarised as follows. The probability of a country being in scenarios that are most
favourable to development increases the higher the growth rate of agricultural productivity, the more rapid the
accumulation of human capital, the faster the structural transformation of the productive system, and the more
widespread access to infrastructures is. We also find some important structural effects linked to a country's legal
origin and geographical position. Finally, we provide evidence of the importance of initial conditions: economies
at earlier stages of economic development and initially characterised by wider inequalities are more likely to end
up in a scenario that is more favourable to development. Taken together, these results highlight what we
believe is an important story: countries are not destined by nature or colonial heritage to remain trapped into
underdevelopment. 'Good' policies exist that can help countries achieve scenarios that are most conducive to a
rapid improvement of development indicators.
The rest of the article is organised as follows. In section II we set our article in the context of the existing
literature. In section III we define and characterise the four scenarios that constitute the object of our study.
Section IV discusses the econometric results. Section V provides a summary and conclusion. An Online Appendix
with detailed material, including data construction and sources, additional econometric results, and sensitivity
analysis is made available separately.

II. This Article in the Context of the Literature
This article relates to the vast literature on the empirical determinants of development outcomes which consists
of several strands. There is of course a well established line of research that uses per capita gross domestic
product (GDP) as a proxy for development, thus estimating regression models in the level of income. Notable
examples of this approach include, inter alia, Acemoglu et al. ([3]), Sachs ([35]), Rodrik et al. ([34]), Cartensen

and Gundlach (2006), Nunn ([30]), Bhattacharyya ([9]), and Alexeev and Conrad ([6]). A second avenue of
research estimates single equation regressions of specific development indicators, such as, the poverty
headcount (see, among others, Bourguignon, [11]; Chhibber and Nayyar, [15]; Loayza and Raddatz, [27]; and
Ravaillon and Datt, [33]); mortality, life expectancy, or some other health indicator (see Powles, [32]; Deaton,
[19]; and Cutler et al., [17]);[1] school enrolment rates, literacy rates, or related measures of educational
attainments (see, inter alia, Flug et al., [22]; Gupta et al., [23]; Carmignani, [12]).
Even though there is likely to be a positive correlation between different development dimensions, disaggregate
indicators such as those mentioned above are not representative of development in its multidimensionality. For
this reason, a third strand of empirical analysis, more recent and certainly less voluminous than the previous
two, makes use of some aggregate measure of development as the dependent variable in the regression model.
This practice is indeed facilitated by the availability of a well-known index of human development (HDI). This
index is prepared by the United Nations Development Programme exactly with the scope to condense different
components of a broad notion of development into a single indicator. While not immune from criticisms,
especially with respect to the weighting system used to aggregate the individual components, the HDI has been
used in academic research (see, for instance, Zgheib et al., [36]; Constantini and Monni, [16]). An alternative is
suggested by Avom and Carmignani ([12]) who aggregate different indicators of health and education by means
of principal components.
In this article we take a different methodological route to the analysis of the determinants of development.
Instead of measuring development directly, we identify the scenarios that lead to development (or
underdevelopment) and then study the probability of a country ending-up in any one of these scenarios. The
scenarios arise from the combination of growth and changes in inequality. We therefore have: (i) scenario one:
positive growth and decreasing inequality; (ii) scenario two: positive growth and increasing inequality; (iii)
scenario three: negative growth and decreasing inequality; and (iv) scenario four: negative growth and
increasing inequality. These scenarios correspond to systematically different dynamics of several development
indicators so that, in fact, they are naturally ordered from most conducive to development (scenario one) to
least conducive to development (scenario four). Once the scenarios are defined, an ordered probit model will be
used to see how different structural and policy factors affect the probability of a country achieving the most
favourable (or the least favourable) scenario. To this purpose, we construct a categorical variable that takes
values 0, 1, 2, and 3 (the variable equals 0 for observations falling in scenario one, value 1 for observations
falling in scenario two and so on). In this way we can adopt a rich specification of the right hand side variables
while accounting for the simultaneous evolvement of growth and inequality. Methodologically our article is
therefore nested within the class of models with limited dependent variables that have been analysed in
Maddala ([29]).
There are important advantages in pursuing this approach. First, we are able to study the determinants of broad
development rather than focusing on a single specific dimension or indicator. The ordering of scenarios from
most favourable to least favourable holds for several different development measures, including the poverty
headcount, child mortality, life expectancy, malnutrition, immunisation, and female literacy. Therefore, we are
not just running, say, a poverty regression. Instead, by studying what affects the probability of a country
achieving the most favourable scenario, we are in fact studying how policy and structural factors contribute to
the creation of conditions that are conducive to development in its multiple forms. Equally important is the fact
that we are able to do this without having to aggregate different indicators into a single synthetic measure. We
therefore avoid the complications and arbitrary choices associated with the design of a weighting system that
instead plague the construction of the HDI.
A second advantage of our approach is that it does not require us to model growth and inequality separately. As
pointed out in Lundberg and Squire ([28]), single equation estimation of growth and inequality is problematic

given that the two processes are jointly endogenous. In this context, system estimation offers a superior
alternative by modelling growth and inequality as the joint outcomes of other variables. But system estimation is
not immune from pitfalls. In fact, the estimation of structural parameters in a system of endogenous equations
requires exclusion restrictions (see Huang et al., [25]). However, finding theoretically justifiable and meaningful
exclusion restrictions is a hard task. Furthermore, if one equation in the system is misspecified, then the
estimates of the other equations in the system will also be contaminated. In this sense, estimates from Three
Stage Least Squares (3SLS), or even Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations (SURE), often turn out to be very
sensitive to the choice of regressors and identifying restrictions. Finally, when the equations in the system are
simultaneously endogenous, multicollinearity between any of the endogenous dependent variables and the
other regressors can significantly reduce the precision of coefficient estimates. To deal with these problems, one
might want to adopt parsimonious specifications of the two equations, but this, in turn, increases the risk of
misspecification. With our approach, instead, we are able to estimate a rich specification of the right hand side
variables while accounting for the simultaneous evolvement of growth and inequality.
Using a categorical variable when continuous variables (in this case growth and changes in inequality) are
available might involve a cost in terms of loss of information. However, we argue that this cost, in the specific
case of our dataset, is not large. We provide three bits of evidence to support our statement. First, we estimate
a standard system of two equations with growth and inequality as dependent variables (see Online Appendix,
section AI). While the sign of the estimated coefficients from the system is generally coherent with the sign of
the estimated coefficients from the ordered probit model, the standard errors tend to be larger in the system. In
other words, the ordered probit model seems to yield more precise estimates. Second, we show that our
categorical variable has a very strong and significant association with development outcomes. To this purpose,
we regress development indicators on the categorical variable (see Online Appendix, section AII). The estimated
coefficient of the categorical variable is always statistically significant at the 1 per cent level and the goodness of
fit of the regression ranges between 0.3 and 0.4. A regression of the same development indicators on growth
and changes in inequality yields similar goodness of fit, with estimated coefficients that occasionally fail to be
significant at the 1 per cent level. Moreover, the coefficient of the categorical variable remains highly significant
even when growth and inequality are added to the regression. Third, as documented in the next section,
variation across scenarios explains a large proportion of total variation in development indicators, growth, and
changes in inequality. This means that explaining why some countries are able to achieve scenario one while
others are not goes a long way towards explaining why some countries develop and others do not.

III. Scenarios of Development
Our dataset consist of a sample of 145 observations covering 71 developing countries. Each observation is taken
over sub-periods of at least five years. For each variable, we measure its level at the beginning of the relevant
sub-period (the 'initial' value) and its annualised rate of change over the entire sub-period.[2]
For any given country c and sub-period t, let 𝑦𝑦c,t denote the change in per capita GDP and 𝑔𝑔c,t the change in the
Gini coefficient. We partition the sample along these two dimensions according to the following rule:
•
•
•
•

– scenario one: 𝑦𝑦c,t > 0 and 𝑔𝑔c,t < 0 (positive growth with decreasing inequality)
– scenario two: 𝑦𝑦c,t > 0 and 𝑔𝑔c,t > 0 (positive growth with increasing inequality)

– scenario three: 𝑦𝑦c,t < 0 and 𝑔𝑔c,t < 0 (negative growth with decreasing inequality)
– scenario four: 𝑦𝑦c,t < 0 and 𝑔𝑔c,t < 0 (negative growth with increasing inequality).

In the full sample of all 145 observations, there are 55 observations that fall in scenario one, 54 in scenario two,
15 in scenario three, and 21 in scenario four.

That a combination of positive growth and decreasing inequality is the best possible scenario for the reduction
of the poverty headcount is a well-known result from the poverty literature (see, for instance, Bourguignon,
[11]). In the rest of this section we provide evidence that the ordering from most favourable (scenario one) to
least favourable (scenario four) holds for various other dimensions of development.
We consider five development indicators in addition to the poverty headcount: child mortality, life expectancy,
child immunisation against diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus (DPT), child malnutrition, and female literacy. The
average rate of change of these indicators in the four scenarios is shown in Table 1. The table also shows the
average rate of growth and change in inequality in each scenario. In the last column we report the standard
deviation of rates of change between scenarios in per cent of the standard deviation of rates of change in the
full sample. This latter statistic is therefore useful to assess how important variation between scenarios is
relative to variation within scenarios.
Table 1. Characterisation of poverty reduction scenarios
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Variation between scenario
Total variation
Poverty headcount −7.57
−2.25
−1.05
16.96
0.53
(2.25)
(2.27)
(4.47)
(3.65)
Life expectancy
0.43
0.16
−0.29
−0.41
0.58
(0.10)
(0.08)
(0.15)
(0.23)
Immunisation DPT 3.85
2.26
−0.03
−3.13
0.64
(1.03)
(1.02)
(0.27)
(1.11)
Female literacy
3.17
1.89
1.01
−1.15
0.49
(1.31)
(0.14)
(1.12)
(0.28)
Malnutrition
−2.11 (
−1.21
−0.71
0.27
0.61
0.88)
(0.45)
(1.05)
(0.31)
Child mortality
−4.42
−2.75
−1.04
0.98
0.47
(0.35)
(0.81)
(0.33)
(0.41)
Per-capita income 2.63
2.78
−1.61
−3.73
0.58
(0.30)
(0.31)
(0.58)
(0.49)
Gini
−1.66
1.69
−2.27
3.76
0.71
(0.25)
(0.25)
(0.48)
(0.40)
Notes: All the variables are expressed in annualized percentage changes. The number in brackets are the
standard deviations of the estimated 𝛼𝛼 from the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression: 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼1 𝑆𝑆1 +
𝛼𝛼2 𝑆𝑆2 + 𝛼𝛼3 𝑆𝑆3 + 𝛼𝛼4 𝑆𝑆4 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , where 𝑥𝑥 is the percentage change in a generic development indicator, 𝑖𝑖 is a generic
country and t a generic sub-period, 𝑆𝑆j is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the observation falls in
scenario 𝑗𝑗 (where 𝑗𝑗 = 1, 2, 3, 4), and 𝜀𝜀 is a disturbance.
The data in the table confirm that the four scenarios are clearly ordered. Scenario one is most conducive to
development, followed by scenarios two, three, and four, respectively. Scenario four is the least conducive to
development. The differences between scenarios are generally large and statistically significant. In fact, for each
indicator, we estimated a regression of its rate of change in scenario j on a constant and dummies for the other
scenarios. The estimated coefficients from these regressions are equal to the difference in the rate of change
between scenario j and any of the other scenarios. We find that these estimated coefficients are generally
statistically significant at usual confidence levels.[3] The statistics reported in the last column also indicate that
variation between scenarios on average accounts for more than half of the total variation in the sample. All in
all, it seems that understanding what drives a country towards any particular scenario is the key to explaining
why development trajectories differ so much across countries.

The data also say something interesting on the relationship between growth and changes in inequality. Political
economy models often predict a trade-off between growth and redistribution, thus implying that a scenario of
positive growth and decreasing inequality is difficult to achieve (see Alesina and Rodrik, [5]; Persson and
Tabellini, [31]). While the available empirical evidence on this trade off is ambiguous (see for instance Banerjee
and Duflo, [8]), in our dataset growth and decreasing inequality do not appear to be mutually exclusive. As just
mentioned, one-third of total sample observations actually fall in scenario one and another third fall in scenario
two. Therefore, everything else being equal, a country going through a period of positive growth is equally likely
to experience sharpening inequalities as it is to experience decreasing inequalities. Moreover, the average rate
of growth in the two scenarios is quite similar, meaning that countries that reduce inequality are not necessarily
penalised in terms of slower growth. In the Online Appendix (section AIII), we provide both parametric and nonparametric evidence confirming that there is no trade-off between growth and decreasing inequality in our data.

IV. Econometric Results
Our purpose in this section is to understand what affects a country's probability to achieve any of the four
scenarios identified in section III. We go about this task by setting up a standard ordered probit model. We then
design a relatively rich specification of regressors to represent an array of economic policies and structural
factors. Finally, we submit our baseline results to various checks (some of which are described in more detail in
the Online Appendix).

The Model
Econometric setting

For each generic observation 𝑖𝑖 in the dataset, the dependent variable is coded as follows: 𝑠𝑠i = 0 if the
observation falls in scenario one, 𝑠𝑠i = 1 if the observation falls in scenario two, 𝑠𝑠i = 2 if the observation falls in
scenario three, and 𝑠𝑠i = 3 if the observation falls in scenario four. The econometric model therefore takes the
form of a multinomial model.
As well-known multinomial models vary according to whether the categories of the dependent variables are
ordered or not. We have argued in sections II and III that our dependent variable involves inherently ordered
outcomes, going from the most favourable scenario to the least favourable scenario for development. The
probability of observation 𝑖𝑖 falling in scenario 𝑗𝑗 (𝑗𝑗 = 0, 1, 2, 3) is then defined as:
(1)

Prob(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝑗𝑗|𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ) = Φ�𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽𝛽� − Φ�𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 − 1 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽𝛽�

where 𝐱𝐱 is a vector of explanatory variables (that is, the structural factors, initial conditions, and policy variables
included in the dataset), Φ denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.), and 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 and 𝛽𝛽
are parameters to be estimated.

The intuition underlying the ordered probit model (1) is that 'conduciveness to development' is a latent process
defined by some interaction between Δ𝑦𝑦 (changes in per capita income) and Δ𝑔𝑔 (changes in income inequality),
which are in turn explained by the vector of variables 𝐱𝐱. While the latent process is not observed, the observed
values of Δ𝑦𝑦 and Δ𝑔𝑔 allow identifying the four categories of the dependent variable 𝑠𝑠i . In model (1) the
stochastic component of the latent process is assumed to have a standard normal distribution. We also
estimated a model using a logistic distribution and results were not qualitatively different.
Model (1) is estimated by maximum likelihood. The sign of the regression parameters 𝛽𝛽 can be interpreted in
terms of the effect that explanatory variables have on the probabilities: a positive estimated coefficient on the

generic variable 𝑥𝑥 means that an increase in x decreases the probability of being in the lowest category and
increases the probability of being in the highest category.

Choice and interpretation of explanatory variables

The set of explanatory variables in model (1) includes country fixed effects, initial conditions, and policy
variables (see Online Appendix, section AV for details on definitions and sources). Starting with the fixed effects,
we control for British legal origin (legor_uk), distance from equator (lat_abst) and ethnic fragmentation (ethnix).
These are time invariant effects that are likely to be important in determining the quality of governance and
institutions. In turn, good institutions should strengthen growth and reduce inequalities.[4] We therefore expect
negative coefficients on both legor_uk and lat_abst and a positive coefficient on ethnix. Among the country
fixed effects we also include a dummy for socialist legal origins (legor_so). Socialist countries in our sample are
peculiar in two respects: (i) they were characterised for most of the sample period by extremely low inequality,
reflecting the socialist or communist ideology, and (ii) most of them went through a prolonged period of
negative growth and growing inequality in connection with the transition from plan to market. We thus
expect legor_so to display a positive estimated coefficient in our model.
The initial conditions we consider are the initial levels of per capita income (i_y_pc) and Gini coefficient (i_gini).
The large body of theoretical and empirical work on conditional convergence suggests that negative growth
should be more likely at higher initial levels of per capita income. The coefficient on i_y_pc should therefore be
positive, even though it is not entirely clear how a higher initial income could affect the likelihood of reductions
in inequality. An initially higher level of inequality makes the reduction of inequality more likely, as it is probably
easier to lower a Gini coefficient of, say, 60 than a Gini coefficient of, say, 30. As already discussed, a higher Gini
coefficient should not be an obstacle to growth, so that in the end i_gini is expected to have a negative
coefficient.
While time invariant effects and initial conditions are all measured in levels, the remaining controls are
measured as annualised percentage changes. We include three indicators that are meant to capture the
structural transformation of the economy. These are the rate of agricultural productivity growth (agr_prod), the
change in the agriculture share of GDP (agr_va), and the change in the industry share of GDP (ind_va). In the
literature, industrialisation is often seen as the key to growth accelerations.[5] A traditional Kuznets-type of
argument then suggests that this transformation would be accompanied by an increase in inequality, at least at
the early stages of development. However, it is unclear to what extent a shift from agriculture to industry
effectively leads to persistently higher inequality. In this respect, our expectation is that the growth effect of
changes in sectoral shares is probably stronger than their distributional effect. The estimated coefficient
on agr_va should hence be negative while the one on ind_va should be positive. At the same, the large weight
that the agricultural sector maintains in many developing economies suggests that productivity growth in that
sector is likely to impact significantly on the growth rate of the economy. To the extent that it reflects a
transition from traditional to modern agriculture, a faster rate of productivity growth should also be associated
with lower inequalities. Consequently, agr_prod is expected to display a negative coefficient.
The increase in the density of telephone lines (t_comm) and the expansion of the proportion of irrigated land
(irrigated) are meant to capture the dynamics of infrastructure development. Better infrastructures are
expected to foster growth.[6] However, their contribution to the dynamics of inequality is ambiguous as it is
likely to depend on their localisation on the territory. If governments decide to develop new infrastructures to
satisfy the higher demand expressed by already economically more advanced areas, then the risk is that
inequality in the country will increase. Avom and Carmignani ([12]) provide evidence that this negative
distributional effect might be statistically significant. Therefore, the coefficient on t_comm and irrigated is
expected to be negative, but the prediction is somewhat ambiguous.

Finally, the policy environment is represented by the growth rates of four variables: (i) credit to the private
sector (credit), (ii) international trade (trade), (iii) government size (gov_cons), and (iv) investment in human
capital (tyr). All of these variables are quite commonly used in the applied analysis of growth and inequality. The
survey of results presented by Durlauf et al. ([20]) suggest that credit, trade, and tyr should all promote growth,
while there is no consensus on the sign of the effect of gov_cons. A wider access to credit should also help
reduce inequalities. Similarly, an increase in human capital investment is usually regarded as an improvement in
earning opportunities for the population at large, thus implying a potentially smoother distribution of income. A
larger government should also contribute to reducing inequalities, to the extent that its size correlates with the
extent of redistribution. On the contrary, results in Lundberg and Squire ([28]) and Carmignani ([13]) indicate
that openness to trade can sharpen inequalities, even though the effect is not necessarily statistically strong.
Overall, there is no ambiguity about the expected sign of tyr and credit, which should be negative. On the other
hand, for both gov_cons and trade a clear-cut prediction cannot be made.

Results
The estimated coefficients of model (1) are reported in Table 2. We initially tested for the potential endogeneity
of the regressors by running separate regressions of Δ𝑦𝑦 and Δ𝑔𝑔 on the set of time-invariant effects and initial
conditions plus each of the other variables.[7] We applied the Hausman endogeneity test (Davidson and
MacKinnon, [18]), using lagged values of the potentially endogenous variables as instruments. It turns out
that credit, tyr, gov_cons, and trade are all endogenous to Δ𝑦𝑦 and/or Δ𝑔𝑔. We therefore use their lagged values
in the estimation of the ordered probit model.
Table 2. Regression results

IV
I
II
III
Gini_down Y_pc_up
VI
V
Legor_uk 0.092
−0.158
−0.120
0.719*
−0.637
..
..
Legor_so 2.719*** 0.008
2.319**
−0.130
−5.284*** 2.172*** 0.413
Lat_abst −3.311** −2.868** −3.578** 2.58
4.272**
−2.944** −2.636***
Ethnic
−0.548
−0.409
−0.718
1.024
0.0138
..
..
I_yp_c
0.729*** 0.397*** 0.691*** −0.188
−1.659*** 0.623*** 0.402***
I_gini
−1.195*
−2.428*** −1.701** 2.080**
0.244
−1.624** −2.204***
Agr_prod −0.212*** −0.177*** −0.215*** 0.134**
0.255*** −0.198*** −0.171***
Agr_va
0.121*** 0.108*** 0.109**
−0.018
−0.196*** 0.122*** 0.117***
Ind_va
−0.051
−0.019
−0.052
−0.013
0.142
..
..
T_comm −0.061** −0.051** −0.035
−0.050**
0.234*** −0.0561** −0.053***
Irrigated −0.035
−0.048
−0.056
0.107**
−0.007
..
..
Credit
−0.216
0.008
−0.324
0.415*
0.081
..
..
Trade
0.202
0.022
0.182
−0.071
−0.879
..
..
Govcons −0.529
−0.261
−0.537
0.656
0.943
..
..
Tyr
−1.005*** ..
−0.921** 0.071
2.681*** −0.607** ..
Obs.
89
122
89
90
93
134
Notes: Models 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 are estimated using an ordered probit. Model 4 is estimated by bivariate probit.
To account for possible reverse causality, credit, govcons, trade, and tyr are all lagged. See the Online Appendix
for variables definition. *, **, *** indicate that estimated coefficients are significant at 1 per cent, 5 per cent,
and 10 per cent confidence level respectively.
Column I provides our baseline results. All of the statistically significant coefficients are in line with our a priori
expectations. Among the time-invariant effects, those that matter the most are geographical location and
socialist legal origin. Initial conditions are statistically very important: a richer country with a lower initial Gini

coefficient is less likely to achieve the most favourable scenario for development. The stage of structural
transformation of the economy also matters: to be conducive to positive growth and declining inequalities, the
transition from agriculture to industry must be accompanied by the modernisation of the agricultural system
and hence by the acceleration of agricultural productivity growth. Finally, the development of
telecommunication infrastructures and the increase in the education level of the population are also conducive
to the achievement of a scenario of positive growth and declining inequality.[8]
In column II we drop the variable tyr, which is not available for all countries in the sample, in order to maximise
the number of observations for estimation. The only noteworthy change concerns the variable legor_so, which
now becomes statistically insignificant. In fact, education data for socialist countries are not widely available.
The regression with tyr therefore includes few observations on socialist legal origins and these few observations
are concentrated in the period that corresponds to the transitional recession. The recovery of several socialist
countries, with positive growth and lowering inequalities, towards the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s is
therefore not captured by the estimates in column I. However, it is captured by the estimates in column II. The
fact that in column II the coefficient of legor_so is not significant can therefore be interpreted of evidence that,
outside the period of the transitional recession, being of a socialist origin does not necessarily push countries
towards an unfavourable development scenario.
In column III we make use of a three-category definition of the dependent variable. The evidence discussed in
section III indicates that (i) scenarios are clearly ordered and (ii) differences between scenarios are statistically
significant. Nevertheless, for a couple of development indicators, the difference between scenarios two and
three might not be strong (see also note 3). Therefore, we test the robustness of our results by estimating a
model where the dependent variable has only three categories: 0 for scenario one, 1 for scenarios two and
three, and 2 for scenario four. The results do not dramatically differ from those reported in column I. However,
we do notice that the coefficient on t_comm is now less precisely estimated. When dropping the
variable tyr (estimates available from the authors upon request) t_comm returns to be statistically significant,
while legor_so becomes non-significant. All in all, we believe that the core of our results holds true whether four
or three categories are defined for the dependent variable. As a further sensitivity check, in the Online Appendix
(section AIV) we also report evidence from a multinomial logit model with unordered outcomes.
In column IV we estimate the effect of each variable separately on the probability of achieving (i) positive
growth and (ii) lower inequality. The underlying setting is a bivariate probit model. In practice, we estimate two
probit equations: in the first one, the dependent variable takes value one if the Gini indicator decreases
(gini_down); in the second equation, the dependent variable takes value one if growth is positive (y_pc_up).
However, we do allow for correlated disturbances across the two probit equations, much in the same spirit as
the seemingly unrelated regression model for continuous variables. A positive estimated coefficient now
indicates that the regressor increases the probability of reducing inequality or achieving positive growth.
The estimates in column IV are useful to understand whether a particular variable plays its role mainly through
the distributional effect (that is, the effect on the change in inequality) or the growth effect (that is, the effect on
the change in per capita income). Interestingly, a few variables appear to activate both effects. This is the case
for agricultural productivity growth and telecommunication infrastructures. However, while agr_prod increases
both the probability of reducing Gini and the probability of positive growth, t_comm generates effects of
opposite sign. In particular, t_comm increases the probability of Δ𝑦𝑦 > 0, but it also reduces the probability of
Δ𝑔𝑔 < 0. The estimates reported in columns I and II suggest that in the end the growth effect dominates, so
that t_comm positively contributes to the achievement of a scenario of growth and decreasing inequality. Of the
other variables that are significant in the aggregate models, most tend to affect the probability of positive
growth more than the probability of lowering inequality. It is, however, important to stress that, with the
exception of t_comm, none of the variables that promotes a positive growth also increase the likelihood of

higher inequalities. Similarly, none of the variables that increase the probability of gini_down also decrease the
probability of positive growth. Taken together, these findings mean that growth and decreasing inequality are
not mutually exclusive, as long as the appropriate set of policies and conditions is in place.
Finally, we estimate a simplified specification of the benchmark model that only includes the statistically
significant variables. We perform this exercise both excluding tyr (column V) and including tyr (column VI)
among the regressors. All of the variables retain their sign and level of statistical significance, thus suggesting
that the estimates are not determined by spurious correlations arising from the inclusion of irrelevant
regressors. Note that the results on legor_so are consistent with the findings from the benchmark specification
in column I. As an additional robustness test (not reported in Table 2, but available upon request), we take each
of the non-significant variables from column I (or II) and add it, one at a time, to the simplified specification of
column V (or VI). None of these other variables turns out to be significant. At the same time, the estimated
coefficients of the variables of the simplified specification remain very similar to those reported in the table.

V. Conclusions
In this article we are concerned with the contribution of economic policies to the creation of conditions that are
most conducive to development. Our point of departure is the observation that the dynamics of several
development indicators can be clustered in four groups and that each group corresponds to a specific
combination of growth and changes in inequality. We can then identify four scenarios that are ordered from
most conducive to least conducive to development. We use an ordered probit model to study how policies and
structural factors affect a country's probability of achieving the most (or least) favourable scenario. This
approach presents a couple of advantages. First, we are able study the determinants of broad development
rather than focusing on a single specific dimension or indicator. Equally important is the fact that we can do this
without having to come up with some arbitrary procedure to aggregate individual development indicators into a
single measure. Second, with the ordered probit model we avoid some of the pitfalls that arise when using
growth and inequality as continuous dependent variables in single or system equation estimation. These
advantages come at no real cost in terms of loss of information as the categorical dependent variable in our
model is a very strong predictor of development outcomes, possibly even stronger than the continuous variables
growth and inequality.
The results point to a comforting picture: good policies help create favourable conditions for development. In
this sense, countries are not condemned to be underdeveloped by initial conditions, geography, or historical
legacies. By implementing the appropriate set of policies, a country can achieve the scenario of positive growth
with declining inequality that provides the most favourable conditions for sustained development. In this
respect, policies promoting the accumulation of human capital and the development of infrastructures appear
to be particularly beneficial. Supporting the structural transformation of the economy and the expansion of the
industrial sector is also going to play an important role. However, our findings indicate that while promoting
structural transformation, governments should avoid treating agriculture as a 'neglected sector'. In fact,
structural transformation should be accompanied by a process of modernisation of the agricultural system to
increase agricultural productivity.
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Online Appendix
AI. System Estimates
Table A1 reports estimates of the following system:
Where y and g are (log) per capita income and Gini index, Δ is the difference operator (so that Δ𝑦𝑦 and Δ𝑔𝑔
respectively denote the growth rate of GDP per capita and the rate of change of income inequality), X and Z are
sets of country-fixed effects (for example, legal origins, distance from equator, ethnic fractionalisation) and
initial values (for example, initial value of log per-capita GDP and/or initial value of log Gini
coefficient), W and M are sets of other policy and structural factors (all expressed in annualised percentage
change), ε and υ are random disturbances, i denotes a generic country, t denotes a generic sub-period, and 𝛼𝛼0 ,
𝛼𝛼1 , 𝛾𝛾0 , 𝛾𝛾1 , A, B, Γ, and Λ are the parameters to be estimated.

To identify the system, some exclusion restrictions must be imposed. In fact, growth and inequality are likely to
be driven by similar processes. Therefore, it is difficult to come up with exclusion restrictions that have a solid
theoretical justification. In fact, this is one of the major pitfalls associated with the estimation of models of
growth and inequality. Nevertheless, we explore two different alternatives. In column I we impose restrictions
by excluding from (A2) some of the controls included in (A1) and vice versa. In column II instead we set α1 and
γ1 equal to zero and estimate a 'quasi-reduced' form model, as suggested by Lundberg and Squire (2003).
Estimation is by Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). Potentially endogenous regressors (that is, those
in B and Λ) are instrumented by their level at the beginning of each sub-period and the lagged value of the rate
of change over the five years before the beginning of each sub-period. The results of the test of over-identifying
restrictions are reported at the bottom of the table.
Table A1. System estimates
Column I
Column II
Growth (eq. A1) Inequality (eq. A2) Growth (eq. A1) Inequality (eq. A2)
Legor_uk
0.967**
−0.082
1.622**
−1.125**
Legor_so
−0.997
−0.089
−1.655
2.156
Lat_abst
..
−1.180*
2.565
−3.846**
Ethnic
0.814
−1.126
0.535
−1.443
I_yp_c
−0.035**
..
−0.171**
−0.263
I_gini
..
−2.830***
1.665
−4.580***
Agr_prod
0.564***
−0.614**
0.140**
−0.310*
Agr_va
−0.043
..
−0.202*
0.074
Ind_va
0.062
−0.025
0.061
−0.035
T_comm
0.430***
0.290**
0.415***
0.129*
Irrigated
−0.012
−0.189
−0.281
−0.531
Credit
−0.028
−0.015
0.003
−0.037
Trade
−0.001
−0.045
−0.048
0.028
Govcons
0.184*
−0.253
0.031
−0.271**
Tyr
0.337**
−0.341*
0.529***
−0.453**
Y_pc
..
−0.861***
Gini
−0.591***
..
J stat (p-value) 0.104 (0.637)
0.137 (0.454)
Notes: GMM estimates of the system of equation A1-A2. Estimated coefficients of the constant terms in each
equation are not reported. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent
confidence level respectively.

Two main conclusions can be drawn from the estimates in the table. First of all, the system estimates and the
ordered probit estimates are qualitatively quite similar. In particular, the sign of the estimated coefficients in the
system is fully coherent with the sign of the estimated coefficients in the ordered probit model. Variables that
have a negative (positive) and significant coefficient in the ordered probit model also display a positive
(negative) coefficient in the growth regression and/or a negative (positive) coefficient in the inequality
regression. Second, if anything, ordered probit estimates are a bit more precise than system estimates. On
average, the degree of statistical significance of coefficients in the ordered probit model is higher than in the
system and some of the variables that happen to be significant in the ordered probit model are not significant in
the system. Given the discussion and evidence presented in sections II and III of the article and in section AII
below, this should not be, perhaps, too surprising.

AII. Regressions of Development Indicator
Table A2 reports Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimates of a regression of development indicators
(expressed in percentage change) on the categorical dependent variable of the ordered probit model, growth,
and inequality (expressed in percentage change). We perform this exercise to see whether using a categorical
dependent variable rather than two separate continuous variables involves any cost in terms of explaining
development patterns.
The top panel of the table reports results of the regression with the categorical variable as the only regressor.
The central panel of the table reports the results of the regression with growth and inequality as the two
regressors. Finally, the bottom panel of the table shows the results of the regression with all of the three
variables included on the right hand side (r.h.s.). For each regression we report R2 as a standard measure of
goodness of fit. To interpret the results, recall that the categorical variable takes value 0 for scenario one (most
conducive to development), value 1 for scenario two, value 2 for scenario three, and value 3 for scenario four
(least conducive to development).
Table A2. Regressions of development indicators
Poverty
Life
Immunisation Years of
Malnutrition Child
headcount
expectancy
schooling
mortality
Ordered
0.876***
−0.0789***
1.272***
0.756***
−0.563***
−0.153***
variable
R2
0.35
0.28
0.37
0.35
0.41
0.32
Growth
−1.431***
0.076**
0.302***
0.376**
−0.650**
−0.045**
Inequality
2.192***
0.048*
0.381
−0.051*
−0.05
0.035**
2
R
0.39
0.24
0.33
0.38
0.27
0.36
Ordered
0.756***
−0.052**
1.036*
0.631***
−0.326*
−0.201***
variable
Growth
−1.286**
0.054**
0.102*
0.252*
−0.717***
−0.016*
Inequality
1.054*
0.005
0.055
−0.079**
−0.01
0.018*
2
R
0.42
0.31
0.30
0.38
0.49
0.36
Notes: GLS estimates of the regression of each development indicator on the categorical variable, growth, and
inequality. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at usual confidence levels.
The estimates suggest three main considerations. First, the association between development outcomes and the
categorical variable is highly significant. Second, the goodness of fit of the regression with the categorical
variable is as high as the goodness of fit of the regression with the two continuous variables. In this sense, it
does not seem that by using the categorical variable we are explaining much less of the total variation of the
development indicators. Third, when the categorical variable is used in the regression together with the two

continuous variables, a problem of multicollinearity (obviously) arises. In spite of this, the categorical variable
remains significant at usual confidence level and it is often statistically more significant than any of the other
two continuous variables.
These results lead us to believe that the use of the categorical variable, in the specific case of this exercise, does
not involve a large cost in terms of loss of information.

AIII. Parametric and Non-parametric Evidence on the Relationship between Growth and
Changes i...

To provide a bit more systematic evidence on the relationship between growth and changes in inequality in our
dataset, we fit a scatter plot of the two variables using two different methods. The first method (panel A of
Figure A1) is a standard linear regression, which implicitly assumes a linear relationship between the two
variables. The second method (panel B of Figure A1) is a non-parametric fit that is known as lowess (Cleveland,
1993). In a nutshell, let (Δ𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 , Δ𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 ) be a generic observation on per capita growth and changes in inequality. We
then run a locally weighted polynomial regression of Δ𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 on Δ𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 using only a subset of observations that lie
around Δ𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 , with smaller weights being given to the observations that are more distant from Δ𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 . The fitted
value of this local regression evaluated at Δ𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 is used as the smoothed value in constructing the curve that links
Δ𝑔𝑔 and Δ𝑦𝑦. The procedure is repeated for each observation (Δ𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 , Δ𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 ) in the full sample until the curve can be
traced out. With this procedure, we therefore impose as little structure on the functional form of the
relationship as possible, which in turn allows us to better account for possible non-linearities.
Graph: Figure A1 The relationship between growth and changes in inequality.

The scatter plot in panel A suggests that the correlation between growth and changes in the Gini coefficient is
negative: as the growth rate increases, the increase in inequality decreases and eventually becomes negative.
While nothing can be said about the direction of causality, the downward sloping regression line supports the
view that there is no trade-off between growth and redistribution. The non-parametric fitted line in panel B
indicates that the relationship might effectively be non-linear: sharply negative at negative values of the growth
rate and then substantially flat. In fact, one might argue that the overall negative slope of the regression line in
panel is largely driven by the observations at negative (or low positive) values of the growth rate. Once growth
turns more significantly positive, the correlation is very close to zero, meaning that growth and declining
inequality move independently from each other. Even in this case, however, the data do not point to a
systematic trade-off in the sense that countries do not necessarily have to accept a lower growth rate to
promote a decrease in inequality and vice versa. The issue is then to understand which policies a country can
implement to achieve a combination of growth and declining inequality.

AIV. Multinomial Logit Model
In sections II and III we argue that our dependent variable is inherently ordered and therefore we estimate an
ordered probit model. While we believe that the statistics reported in section III of the article support this
approach, we acknowledge the possibility that theoretically our scenarios might not represent ordered
categories. In this case, the appropriate econometric framework would be a multinomial logit (or probit) model.
The model specifies the probability of observation 𝑖𝑖 to be in category 𝑗𝑗 (where j = scenario 1, ... , scenario 4) as:
Graph

where all the variables are as in Equation (1) of the article. The identification of model (A3) requires αj to be set
to 0 for one of the categories (the so called base outcome) and hence estimated coefficients are interpreted
with respect to that category.

Estimates of Equation (A3) are reported in Table A3.1 A set of estimated coefficients is reported for each
scenario, with the exception of scenario one. This is because scenario one is chosen as the base scenario. Then,
the estimated coefficients measure the marginal effect that each regressor has on the probability of a given
scenario relative to the base scenario.
Table A3. Multinomial logit
Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Legor_uk −0.962
−0.357
−1.157
Legor_so −1.255
−4.592*** 0.932
Lat_abst −3.636
−1.857
−14.554**
Ethnic
−1.486
−0.254
−2.519
I_yp_c
0.549
0.412
2.649***
I_gini
−5.346*** −0.102
−16.222***
Agr_prod −0.160*
−0.369** −0.786***
Agr_va
0.095
0.348**
0.360**
Ind_va
0.094
−0.016
−0.245
T_comm −0.042
−0.593*** −0.182
Irrigated −0.229** −0.029
−0.781***
Credit
0.120
0.929
−0.667
Trade
0.246
0.500
−1.437
Govcons −1.318
−2.381
−0.208
Obs.
122
Notes: Scenario 1 is the base outcome in the multinomial logit regression. Estimated coefficients therefore
measure the effect that regressors have on the probability of the other scenarios relative to the base scenario.
To account for possible reverse causality, credit, trade, and govcons are lagged. See section AV for variables
definition. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance of the estimated coefficient at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent,
and 1 per cent confidence level respectively.
While the interpretation of coefficients is clearly different from the ordered probit model estimated in the
article, we believe that the multinomial logit results are qualitatively in line with those reported in Table 2 of the
article. In particular, a higher initial per capita income and a lower initial degree of inequality reduce the
probability to achieve the growth and redistribution scenario. At the same time, faster agricultural productivity
growth and better infrastructure increase the likelihood of a country to achieve growth and redistribution.

AV. Variables Description
Unless otherwise indicated, all of the variables are expressed in annualised percentage changes. WDI is the
World Development Indicators Database of the World Bank, 2008 issue.
•
•
•
•
•

•

Poverty headcount: percentage of population living on less than 1 dollar per day (source: PovcalNet,
World Bank).
Life expectancy: number of years that an average individual in the population is expected to live (source:
WDI).
Child mortality: number of children under died before age five per 1000 born (source: WDI).
Immunisation DPT: percentage of children ages 12–23 months who received vaccinations before 12
months (source: WDI).
Malnutrition: percentage of children under age five whose weight for age is more than two standard
deviations below the median for the international reference population ages 02–59 months (source:
WDI).
Female literacy: percentage of female population that can read and write (source: WDI).

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

i_yp_c, per-capita income: real per-capita GDP at constant US dollars (base year 2000) (source: WDI).
This variable is expressed in levels.
i_gini, Gini coefficient of inequality of income distribution (source: PovcalNet, World Bank). This variable
is expressed in levels.
govcons, government size: total government consumption in percent of GDP (source: WDI).
Credit, financial depth: domestic credit to the private sector in percent of GDP (source: WDI).
Trade, international trade openness: exports plus imports in percent of GDP (source: WDI).
tyr, education: number of years of schooling of the average individual in the population (source: Barro
and Lee, 2001; UNESCO).
Legor_uk, UK legal origin: dummy variable taking value 1 if country's legal system originates from the UK
common low code (source: La Porta et al., 1999). This variable is expressed in levels.
Legor_so, Socialist legal origin: dummy variable taking value 1 if country's legal system originates from
the socialist law (source: La Porta et al., 1999). This variable is expressed in levels.
Ethnic, ethnic fragmentation: probability that two randomly selected individuals are not from the same
ethnic group (source: La Porta et al., 1999). This variable is expressed in levels.
Agr_prod, Agricultural productivity: agricultural output per worker employed in the agricultural sector
(source: WDI).
Agr_va: value added of agricultural sector in percent of GDP (source: WDI).
Ind_va: value added of the industrial sector in percent of GDP (source: WDI).
T_comm: density of telecommunication infrastructures. Number of telephone mainlines per 1000
habitants (source: WDI).
Irrigated: proportion of irrigated agricultural land in percent of total agricultural land (source: WDI).

Note
1. We exclude tyr to maximise the number of observations. In fact, when tyr is included, all coefficients retain
the sign reported in Table A3. However, the small number of observations implies large standard errors and only
few of the coefficients turn out to be statistically significant at either the 1 per cent or 5 per cent confidence
level.
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Notes
Footnotes
1. The empirical estimation of the determinants of specific health indicators is obviously a main area of interest
in medical science. See for instance Houweling et al. ([24]) and Blouin et al. ([10]) for two recent
contributions of interest to development economists.

2. The short time series dimension of our panel is due to (i) the limited availability of many development
indicators on a time series basis and (ii) the requirement that percentage changes be computed over
periods of at least five years. The Online Appendix provides a full description of sources and details on
the construction of the dataset.
3. There are few notable exceptions. Thus, with respect to the poverty headcount and malnutrition the difference
between scenario two and scenario three is not significant. With respect to female literacy the difference
between scenario three and scenario four is not significant. All of the estimated coefficients are available
from the authors upon request.
4. The determinants of institutional quality are analysed by La Porta et al. ([26]) and Acemoglu and Johnson ([2]).
Acemoglu ([1]: ch. 22) provides a survey of the voluminous research on the relationship between
institutions and growth. Finally, the effect of institutions on income inequality is investigated, inter alia,
in Carmignani ([13]).
5. See, for instance, Aghion and Howitt ([4]: ch. 10).
6. Esfahani and Ramírez ([21]), among others, discuss the positive contribution of infrastructures to growth.
7. Time invariant effects and initial conditions are pre-determined and therefore treated as exogenous. In the
end, we test for the endogeneity of t_comm, irrigated, credit, trade, tyr, and gov_cons.
8. The estimated threshold parameters μ for the mode in column I are: μ1 = −4.43 (−9.76, 0.89), μ2 = −2.94 (−8.25,
2.36), μ3 = −2.14 (−7.46, 3.16). Estimates for the other models are qualitatively similar and can be
obtained from the authors upon request.
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